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ABSTRACT 
Asymmetric information between the issuer to potential investors believed 
by some academics in finance as one of the main causes of the phenomenon 
of underpricing at the time of the initial public offering (IPO). On science 
and technology-based company main problem lies in how to conduct 
assessments on the future value of a product that is still in the development 
stage. The issue became more prominent on pharmaceutical companies and 
biotechnology, due to the characteristics of this industry is the high expense, 
complex process, and the lengthy process of research and development (R & 
D) of a product. This study describes the characteristics above is associated 
with the phenomenon of underpricing when companies conduct IPO. The 
samples are 82 pharmaceutical companies and biotechnology conduct IPO 
in the United States stock market in 1998-2005. The results of this study 
revealed a negative correlation between the intensity of R & D and IPO 
underpricing phenomenon in this industry. These studies have identified R 
& D as the main source of information asymmetry that led to the 
phenomenon of underpricing for pharmaceutical companies and 
biotechnology. 
 
Keywords: underpricing, asymmetric information, R & D intensity, 
pharmaceutical and biotechnology, IPO. 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
For the science and technology 
based firm especially in the 
pharmaceutical and biotech industries, 
the potential source of asymmetric 
information between the firm’s insiders 
(firm’s managers and underwriters) and 
investors, is on how to value the future 
outcomes of research and development 
(R&D) activities. Firms within the 
industries are characterized by relatively 
high investments in R&D and have very 
few tangible assets. The value of the firm 
therefore, depends on the success of 
R&D, which is related to new and 
untested technologies or products, while 
the future outcomes of the efforts are 
uncertain. In this regard, the firm’s 
insiders are still better informed about the 
progress of R&D and therefore they can 
be expected to have better assessment 
about the value of the company. On the 
other hand, investors can only judge the 
value of the company from R&D 
expenditures and aggregate information 
regarding R&D activities which are 
publicly revealed in the prospectus. 
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Fortunately, it is common for the firms 
within pharmaceutical and biotech 
industries, to supplement their prospec-
tuses with vast disclosure of the R&D 
activities. Therefore, investors in the 
industries are relatively better informed 
concerning the prospect of the firms in 
the future. In this particular way, there 
are possibilities that some optimistic 
investors may overestimate the benefit of 
R&D efforts of the firm. As a result, 
potential investors may take optimistic 
predictions about the future cash flows 
generated by technological breakthroughs 
or brand new products from the R&D 
efforts. Accordingly, the conjecture in 
this paper is that underpricing 
phenomenon still exists in the 
pharmaceutical and biotech firms during 
IPO. 
The empirical literature related to 
this study documents that R&D intensity 
is associated with return volatility after 
controlling for some variables such as 
firm size, age, and industry effects (Chan 
et.al.:2001). Chan et. al. argue that the 
insufficient accounting disclosure 
regarding R&D activities may have a 
consequence on high degree of 
uncertainty on the firm’s future prospect 
for investors. Hence, the volatility of the 
returns will rise with the level of R&D 
intensity.  Another research paper which 
focuses on the short term and long term 
IPO anomalies by R&D finds that for the 
overall industries, the extent of IPO first-
day underpricing and long term 
performance is positively related to the 
R&D intensity of the issuers (Guo et. al.: 
2006). Guo et. al suggest that R&D is the 
main contributor for asymmetric 
information surrounding the IPO which 
in turn, has an impact on the IPO 
underpricing. Both studies have shown 
the relationship between the problem of 
asymmetric information on R&D 
activities and mispricing of the stocks, 
which is important for the arguments in 
this paper.  
Relative to the overall industries, 
the problem of asymmetric information is 
magnified on pharmaceutical and biotech 
firms in which their efforts are mainly 
based on the R&D activities. For 
investors, asymmetric information 
regarding R&D activities can heavily 
affect the process of firm’s evaluation 
during IPO. Therefore, adequate 
disclosure of R&D activities for the IPO 
firms within the industries is crucial in 
order to prevent misvaluation.  
The problem is that despite the 
firms in the industries have equipped 
their prospectuses with extensive 
disclosure regarding the progress and 
future prospect of R&D activities, the 
outcomes of R&D are highly 
unpredictable. Traditional valuation 
models have proved to be insufficient to 
fully reflect the value of R&D. The R&D 
activities in the industries are considered 
as a costly and complex process. The 
process of drug development for 
example, can take up to 10-15 years 
before it can be released to the market 
(see the detail on PhARMA: 2007). 
Given the characteristics, valuation of 
R&D using a compound real option 
model is often regarded as an alternative 
to solve the problem above. However, the 
valuation using this model is still 
problematic for investors since some of 
variables which are employed in the 
model such as the rate of volatility 
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(standard deviation), the time, and the 
costs needed for each stage which are 
very unique for each firm (even specific 
for each product), may differ from those 
applied by the firm’s insiders.  
Secondly, despite extensive 
disclosures in the prospectus regarding 
R&D activities, the asymmetric 
information problem may still persist due 
to the corporate strategy.  Sensitive 
information is believed to be retained 
within the insiders and it can not be 
revealed in the prospectus as it may 
benefit competitors. Pharmaceutical and 
biotech firms are basically in a strict 
competition to discover new products or 
drugs and secure their patent protections. 
Therefore, proprietary information 
concerning the research and development 
of the product should be treated carefully 
before releasing it to public.  
The theories and previous studies 
linked the contribution of R&D to 
asymmetric information, and then have a 
consequence on the valuation of the 
firms, are important to develop the 
hypothesis in this paper. In 
pharmaceutical and biotech industries, 
the firms are characterized by high level 
of R&D intensity which is defined as 
how much resources of the firm are 
dedicated to the R&D activities. Despite 
vast information regarding R&D has been 
disclosed in the prospectuses, R&D still 
presumes as the main contributor for 
uncertainty for investors. Furthermore, 
earlier studies also indicate the 
relationship between asymmetric 
information and IPO underpricing. 
Accordingly, the hypothesis for this 
paper is that,  
 
“Hypothesis: For the firms within 
pharmaceutical and biotech 
industries, the R&D intensity as a 
proxy for asymmetric information is 
associated with the initial IPO 
underpricing.” 
 
Therefore, the purpose of this research 
paper is to examine whether R&D 
intensity is the main source of 
asymmetric information between the 
potential investor and the insider for 
pharmaceutical and biotech firms. As 
consequence, it will lead to cause 
underpricing for the firms during IPO.  
Compare to other papers which are 
trying to explain IPO underpricing 
phenomenon within the firms with 
relatively high R&D intensity, this paper 
is focus to the pharmaceutical and biotech 
industries. Given the complexity of the 
product development process, obviously 
this characteristic makes the study of 
examining these industries even more 
specific to address the problem. 
Furthermore, this study pays more 
attention on finding the source of 
asymmetric information which is in other 
study is still unclear, hence use other 
variables as proxies. 
 
 
THE ORETICAL BACKGROUND 
 
Research and Development Process for 
Pharmaceutical and Biotech Firms 
Research and development 
expenditures for pharmaceutical and 
biotechnology industries are tightly 
related to the costs of product 
development. These costs depend on the 
type of the products (synthetic or 
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biological compounds), the risks of 
failure during the development and the 
novelty of the products. Some of new 
products are created based on the existing 
products (incremental modifications) and 
some of those are developed from the 
scratch. The former product development 
substantially requires fewer R&D 
investments relative to those does in the 
latter. A recent empirical study indicates 
that the average costs of developing a 
brand new innovative drug can reach 802 
millions dollars (measured in year 2000 
US dollars) including the costs spent on 
the failed drugs and the costs of capital 
(DiMasi et. al.:2003).  
Not only the product development 
in the industries requires large 
investments in R&D, but also the process 
of development itself is very time 
consuming. It can take about 10 until 15 
years to develop a new drug from the 
discovery stage until receiving the 
marketing approval from the FDA. To 
create a new drug, the process of product 
development has to follow sequences 
(possibly overlapping sequences) of steps 
which is called a development paradigm. 
In the US, the drug’s development 
paradigm is relatively unique and can be 
modeled as presented in Table I. The 
development begins with the discoveries 
of biological or synthetic compounds 
which are then tested on animals during a 
pre-clinical step. Only approximately 250 
compounds out of 5.000-10.000 
compounds created during the discovery 
stage can actually go into the pre-clinical 
testing. The process is continued to Phase 
I to perform the clinical tests on healthy 
humans. In this clinical phase, about 20-
100 healthy human volunteers are needed 
to collect the data concerning the safe 
dozes, metabolic effects, and toxicity of 
the compounds. Out of 250 compounds 
during the pre-clinical stage, only about 
five most promising compounds can enter 
the clinical phases. Phase II clinical tests 
is conducted to the patients who suffer 
targeted diseases, to gather the data 
concerning the safety of the compounds, 
the validity of the data collected in the 
previous phase, and the preliminary data 
on efficacy. The scale of observations in 
this stage is substantially larger than 
those in the Phase I by involving about 
100-500 patients. 
Table I:                                                                                                                                                         
The R&D Process, Average Time and Compounds Success Rate by Stage 
Stage Description Average 
Time  
 
Compound 
Success Rate 
Discovery 
 
 Find a candidate drug. 
 Conduct initial tests on every 
promising compound. 
 Optimize remaining leads for safety 
and effectiveness. 
6 years 5000-10.000 
compounds  
Preclinical 
Testing 
 Test candidate drugs in the 
laboratory and in animals. 
 Develop and test process to make 
250 compounds 
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drugs for clinical trials. 
 
Clinical Phase 
I 
 Conduct Phase I trials (20–100 
healthy volunteers). 
 To establish safe dosages and to 
gather information on the absorption, 
distribution and metabolic effects, 
excretion and toxicity of the 
compound. 
1.8 years 5 compounds 
Clinical Phase 
II 
 Conduct Phase II trials (100–500 
volunteers with the target condition). 
 To obtain evidence on safety and 
preliminary data on efficacy. 
2.1 years 
Clinical Phase 
III 
 Conduct Phase III trials (1,000–
5,000 volunteers with the target 
condition). 
 Design to firmly establish efficacy 
and to uncover side-effect that occur 
infrequently. 
2.5 years 
FDA Approval  Submit New Drug Application 
(NDA), which includes up to 
100,000 pages of information on 
research findings, analysis of clinical 
trial results, and proposed labeling 
and manufacturing plan. 
1.5 year 1 compound 
Sources: PhARMA (2007), DiMasi (2003) 
 
In Phase III, the scale of the tests even 
larger than those in Phase II, by testing 
about 1.000-5.000 patients to establish 
the efficacy of the compounds in curing 
the diseases, and to uncover irregular side 
effects of the compounds. The final step 
is to submit a new drug application, 
which includes information on research 
findings, analyses of clinical tests results, 
and proposed labeling and manufacturing 
plan, to the FDA for marketing approval. 
Only one out of five new drug candidates 
that enter the clinical phases is actually 
received the marketing approval from the 
FDA. An investigation on the marketing 
performance of the drugs approved by the 
FDA reveals that only 30 percent of 
marketable drugs generate enough 
income to cover the R&D expenses, spent 
during the development (PhARMA: 
2007). 
Based on a previous study, on 
average the firms need about 21.6, 25.7 
and 30.5 months to complete Phase I, 
Phase II and Phase III respectively during 
the process of development. However, 
the average total time required for the 
development, from the beginning of 
clinical phase to the marketing approval 
by the FDA is estimated to be 90.3 
Tommy C. Efrata, R&D Intensity and IPO Underpricing..... 
6 
 
months (DiMasi et. al. 2003). As this 
estimation is based on the newly 
innovative drug samples, the length of the 
development process can be relatively 
shorter for the incremental modification 
drugs.   
As described above, for each stage 
during product development, firms hold 
the risks of failure. If during the process, 
the tested compounds fail to meet the 
designated requirements and hence the 
likelihood to be granted a marketing 
approval by the FDA is small, the firms 
must withdraw the compounds from the 
development. DiMasi et. al. document 
that the probability of investigational 
compounds to enter the next step during 
the development is narrower for the latter 
stage. Focusing on the clinical phases 
during the process of drug development, 
the paper documents that the probability 
of entering the successive phase decrease 
by clinical stage. Measuring from Phase I 
(100 percent), the probability of 
investigational compounds to enter Phase 
II is 71 percent and the probability 
decreases at 31.4 percent on Phase III. 
The paper from the same authors 
also finds that the average of the clinical 
stages costs per investigational 
compound increases considerably by 
clinical phase. This is particularly true for 
Phase III which requires large scale of 
observations, involving many human 
volunteers to gather the data. The paper 
documents that the average costs for the 
Phase I and Phase II are about 15.2 and 
23.5 millions dollars (measured in 2000 
US dollars). The average costs for the 
Phase III are 86.3 millions dollars which 
increases substantially by more than three 
folds compare to the average costs of the 
previous phase.  
Given the importance and 
complexity of R&D activities in the 
pharmaceutical and biotechnology 
industries above, there is no wonder that 
these backbone activities become a 
subject of much attention for firms’ 
insiders and investors during valuation of 
the firms. In the sectors, the large amount 
of expenditures in R&D activities is 
regarded as intangible assets for the 
firms. Some of the firms even have very 
few tangible assets so that the R&D 
expenses actually exceed the total assets 
of the firms. Hence it is crucial to 
understand the nature of these particular 
assets in order to better evaluate the 
firms. Under current US accounting 
principals (GAAP), the firms do not 
oblige to report intangible assets in the 
financial statements. Hence, when the 
firms have a considerable amount of 
intangible assets, the lack of detail in 
financial reporting of these assets 
complicate the valuation of the firms for 
the investors. 
 
Asymmetric Information and 
Underpricing 
When a firm decides to trade their 
shares publicly, the most important issue 
yet has to be determined is to value the 
company. Based on the valuations, the 
firm’s insider then set the new issuance’s 
offering price for IPO. Valuing the firm 
within pharmaceutical and biotechnology 
industries must rely heavily on the 
potential outcomes of the R&D activities 
while the future outcomes of the R&D 
are highly unpredictable. It is because the 
R&D outcomes are tightly linked to the 
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novelty of the products and untested 
technologies. During the valuation, the 
firm usually hires investment bankers or 
underwriters to assist the firm’s managers 
on the pricing and marketing of new 
stocks. Underwriters also help the firm’s 
manager to conduct due diligence 
investigations, write the prospectuses, 
and file the necessary documents to the 
Securities Exchange Commission (SEC). 
In order to value the firms, the 
underwriters usually perform several 
approaches simultaneously such as 
discounted cash flows analyses, 
comparable firm analyses, a compound 
real option model, etc. In this regard, 
along with the firm’s managers, 
underwriters are believed to have better 
knowledge and information which are 
necessary for determining the offering 
price of the new issuance. On the 
preparation of IPO, SEC will ask the firm 
to disclose information to the public in 
the prospectus including the R&D budget 
prior to IPO. In the US, the regulations 
also require the firm to file the documents 
covering the descriptions of the firm’s 
business and financial statements in 
accordance GAAP.  
Unfortunately, most of the firms 
only report barely the aggregate amount 
of R&D expenditures in the prospectuses 
without further explanations. Hence the 
accounting information of R&D only 
provides limited usefulness for investors. 
Exception on this condition includes 
pharmaceutical and biotechnology firms. 
The firms in the industries reveal 
extensive information about their R&D 
activities in their prospectuses (Guo et. 
al.: 2006). In addition, they also 
consistently disclose the information 
regarding the R&D activities in the 
annual financial statements. The firms 
often explain broadly about their R&D 
activities and the prospect of the products 
under development. Even so, the detail of 
the sensitive information is believed still 
to be retained by the firm’s insiders due 
to competitive consideration as it may 
benefit the competitors. The information 
regarding the failures of some 
compounds to enter Phase II or Phase III 
during the clinical tests will not be passed 
to the hand of competitors (Aboody and 
Lev: 2000). On the other hand, as 
described above, the detail information 
about the progress including the 
probability to successfully receive the 
marketing approval from the FDA, 
during product development is essential 
for the valuation of the firms. In this 
regard, despite the extensive disclosure 
about the R&D activities in the sectors, 
information asymmetry still persists 
because the firms’ insiders have better 
information about R&D activities. The 
insiders can continually monitor the 
progress of the product development as 
well as the probability of success while 
the investors obtain only aggregate 
information provided by the firms in the 
prospectuses.  
Further, the asymmetric informa-
tion can also come from the limitation of 
the potential investors to comprehend the 
valuation of the company, given the 
information they have. Because of the 
relative complicated process of R&D 
activities and product development, it is 
difficult for investors to understand about 
the productivity and the value of the 
firm’s R&D (Aboody and Lev: 2000). 
Accordingly, acquiring such of that 
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information is also costly for investors, 
requiring them to have sufficient 
scientific knowledge and considerable 
time. In addition, public may also 
overwhelm with too many R&D 
information pouring to them so that 
selecting relevant information is an 
exhausting process. As a result, some 
investors may overestimate the long term 
benefit of the R&D outcomes, due to the 
wide coverage of the possible success of 
certain medicines by the media, and 
systematic marketing effort by the 
investment industry. 
Regardless relatively extensive 
information about the progress of product 
development has been explained in the 
prospectuses, asymmetric information 
between firm’s insiders and potential 
investors still persists during IPO for the 
firms within pharmaceutical and biotech 
industries. As a consequence, the value of 
the company perceived by the investors 
will most probably differ than the value 
measured by the corporate insiders or 
underwriters. The valuation of the firms 
by the issuers is reflected on the offering 
prices at the time of IPO. On the other 
hand, the investors may think that this 
price does not precisely replicate the 
value of the firm. As a result, the market 
price of the stocks may differ than the 
offering price during IPO. On average, 
the closing market price on the initial 
days of trading is higher than the offering 
price set by the firm. In general, the new 
issued underpricing exists in stock 
markets of every country even though the 
extent of underpricing varies one to each 
other (Ritter: 1998).   
The asymmetric information may 
create the sense of uncertainty for the 
potential investors concerning the true 
value of the firms. The existence of 
information asymmetry is also believed 
by many scholars as the explanation for 
IPO underpricing phenomenon (Ritter 
(2004), Carter et. al. (1998)).  However, 
they rarely identify the source of 
asymmetric information, instead they 
vaguely use less clear-cut variables such 
as firm age, retained ownership, 
underwriter reputation etc. as proxies of 
asymmetric information (Guo et. al.: 
2006). In the pharmaceutical and 
biotechnology industries, R&D has a 
function to support the continuity of the 
firms. For the firms within the industries, 
investments in R&D is regarded as 
intangible assets which like any other 
intangible assets such as branding and 
staff training physically is very difficult 
to value. To value the company by 
comparing it with the similar or matching 
firms may not yield an intended result 
since as describe above the R&D 
activities in very unique and specific to 
the each firm. The IPO firms are 
generally dominated by new and young 
establishments so that the valuation of the 
firm in connection with the tangible asset 
is very tricky to measure. 
Many empirical studies have 
already worked on this issue by relating 
the stocks price and R&D expenditures. 
An empirical study which investigates 
whether the stocks markets properly 
account for the value of R&D 
expenditures documents that R&D 
intensity is positively associated with 
return volatility (Chan et. al. 2001). 
Another study related to this subject also 
concerns about the presence of the 
asymmetric information due to the 
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insufficient disclosure of R&D activities; 
and the possibility for the firm’s insiders 
to benefit from it. The study provides the 
evidence that insiders’ gains on the firms 
which are actively engaged in the R&D 
activities are significantly larger than the 
firm without R&D activities (Aboody and 
Lev: 2000).  
 
 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
Sources of the Data 
The initial sample consists of 115 
initial public offering (IPO) firms in the 
US stock exchange markets (NASDAQ, 
American Exchange and NYSE) during 
1998-2005 for the biotechnology and 
pharmaceutical industries. The IPO firms 
for the sample therefore must be within 
the first three digits 283 on the industrial 
classification code (SIC) including 2833 
for medicinal chemicals and botanical 
products, 2834 for pharmaceutical 
preparations, 2835 for in vitro and in vivo 
diagnostic substances and 2836 for 
biological products, except diagnostic 
substances. 
 
Table II:                                                                                                                                               
Distribution of IPO Firms in the Final Sample by SIC Code 
SIC Code Definition  Number  Percentage of the  Final 
Sample 
2833 medicinal chemicals and 
botanical products 
 
 
0  0 
2834 pharmaceutical 
preparations 
 68  82.93 
2835 in vitro and in vivo 
diagnostic substances 
 
 
2  2.44 
2836 biological products, 
except diagnostic 
substances 
 
 
12  14.12 
 
The primary data for IPO firms and 
the offering prices are derived from 
SEC’s Electronic Data Gathering and 
Retrieval (EDGAROnline) which is 
available at http://ipoportal.edgar-
online.com. The other data such as total 
assets, long term liabilities, research and 
development expenditures, number of 
outstanding shares prior to IPO including 
number of new issued shares, managing 
underwriters and presence of venture 
capitalists are taken from SEC’ filings 
form 424B4 (final prospectuses), S1/A or 
S1 for each IPO which are accessible 
through SEC-Edgar database at 
http://www.sec.gov. Information for the 
founding year of the firms is retrieved 
from two sources, first from Jay Ritter 
data base which is accessible at 
http://bear.cba.ufl.edu/ritter/ipodata.htm 
and alternatively from the respective 
prospectus for each firm. Finally the daily 
market closing prices and benchmark 
indexes (such as S&P 500 composite 
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index and S&P 500 PHARM for 
pharmaceutical industry) are retrieved 
from the Thomson Financial Datastream 
(TFD).  
 
Sampling Method 
The initial sample is then filtered 
due to unavailability or inconsistency of 
the data. Most notably, some the firms 
within the initial sample are not included 
because the daily market closing prices 
are not provided by the TFD because of 
the trading suspensions or the firms’ 
stocks are no longer actively traded in the 
markets when the data of this research 
was collected. Some initial samples also 
exhibit inconsistency in the values among 
the data sources (SEC-Edgar, Edgar 
Online and TFD) and for those which can 
not be verified are excluded from the 
observation. In total, 21 IPO firms within 
the initial sample fall into this category.  
 
Table III:                                                                                                                                                  
Distribution of Initial Sample and Final Sample by Year 
Year 
Initial Sample 
(IPO Firms) 
Final Sample 
(IPO Firms) 
Percentage of 
Initial sample 
Percentage of 
Total Final 
Sample 
1998 10 2 20 2.44 
1999 9 5 55.56 6.10 
2000 37 26 70.27 31.71 
2001 4 4 100 4.88 
2002 5 3 60 3.66 
2003 9 7 77.78 8.54 
2004 26 22 84.62 26.83 
2005 15 13 86.67 15.85 
Total 115 82 71.30 100 
 
Further, some of firms’ financial 
statements reported zero R&D 
expenditures prior to IPO (7 IPO firms) 
and those firms also are excluded from 
the final sample. At the end, I also 
observed some irregularities on the ratios 
of R&D expenditures to the book value 
for some IPO firms (5 IPO firms), in 
which I consider these firms as the 
outliers therefore I also leave out these 
firms and do not include them for the 
observation. Therefore, the final sample 
of this research includes 82 IPO firms or 
about 71.30 percent of 115 IPO firms in 
the initial sample.  
Table III shows the distribution of 
the IPO firms by year in the final sample. 
It becomes apparent that most of the IPO 
firms in the final sample are concentrated 
in 2000 and 2004. Inspection of Table III 
indicates that the IPO firms are 
concentrated in those two years by about 
32 and 27 percent respectively of the total 
IPO firms in the final sample. Most 
probably, it comes about because the US 
stocks exchanges have experienced 
bullish markets during these two years, 
creating the conducive environment for 
the firms to commence IPO. A previous 
empirical study has linked the period of 
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high stock market returns and the volume 
of IPO activities (Ritter: 1998). On the 
contrary, the low number of IPO firms 
between those two years is presumably 
caused by bearish markets during the post 
internet bubble as well as nine-eleven 
tragedy. 
 
Main Variables  
The dependent variable in the 
regression models is the first-day IPO 
underpricing which is described as the 
difference between the offering price set 
by the firm and the first-day closing 
price. For the explanatory variable, the 
R&D intensity is measured as a ratio 
between the annual R&D expenditures 
and the net assets of the firm. 
Alternatively, the R&D intensity is 
calculated as the ratio of R&D expenses 
to the expected market value of the firm. 
Thus in this case one can safely say that 
both indicators for the R&D intensity are 
observable to public at the time of IPO.  
 
 
MODELS AND ANALYSIS 
 
Models 
To examine the association 
between the extent of IPO underpricing 
and information asymmetry as proxied by 
the level of R&D intensity of the firms, I 
developed the ordinary least square 
(OLS) models. The main reason for using 
natural logarithm on both R&D intensity 
variables in the models is to impose a non 
linear relationship between the extent of 
underpricing and the level R&D 
intensity. The non linear regression 
models are actually better suited to mimic 
the association between underpricing and 
the level of R&D intensity. This is 
important because the effect of 
information asymmetry on the extent of 
underpricing is unlikely to be uniform 
across different level of R&D intensity of 
the firm, given the nature of R&D 
activities in the industries. Having a non 
linear relationship in the models implies 
that the every percentage increase on the 
level of R&D intensity will give a 
constant level increase or decrease on the 
extent of underpricing, which depend on 
the sign of estimated coefficient of the 
R&D intensity. Stated differently, the 
change on the extent of underpricing 
decreases, as the level of R&D intensity 
increases. 
 
adj_ret_1d = α + β 
logR&D/net_assets + ε ....(1) 
adj_ret_1d = α + β 
logR&D/exp_mv + ε  .......(2) 
 
Column one and two of Table IV 
indicate the estimated coefficients of the 
R&D intensity for the two regression 
models above. For Model (1) the 
coefficient of R&D intensity measured by 
the ratio of R&D expenditures to book 
value is negative 0.072 and statistically 
significant at one percent level of 
confidence. Similarly, inspection of 
Model (2), the coefficient for R&D 
intensity measured by the ratio of R&D 
expenditures to expected market value is 
negative 0.077 and also statistically 
significant at one percent level of 
confidence. In other words, one can say 
that ceteris paribus, ten percent increase 
on the level of R&D intensity will reduce 
the adjusted first-day initial returns as 
much as 0.0072 and 0.0077 for Model (1) 
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and (2) respectively. The outcomes 
confirm the hypothesis that the extent of 
IPO underpricing is related to the R&D 
intensity of the firms within the 
pharmaceutical and biotechnology 
industries. 
 
Table IV:                                                                                                                                                     
Simple Regression Models of the First-Day IPO Adjusted Returns on the R&D 
Intensity 
 Model (1) Model (2) 
 adj_ret_1d adj_ret_1d 
logR&D/net_assets -0.072 **  
 (-2.93)  
logR&D/exp_mv  -0.077** 
  (-2.95) 
Constant 0.005 
(0.21) 
-0.171 
(-2.26) 
Observations 82 82 
F-test 8.61** 13.02** 
R-squared 0.11 0.14 
Note: 
Absolute value of t-statistics in parentheses (with robust s.e.) 
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
 
 
Some early empirical studies 
proved that some factors also have 
contributions to influence the extent of 
IPO underpricing. Therefore, on the 
subsequent models, I introduced these 
factors as the controlling variables.  
 The first explanatory variable is the 
age of the firm at the time of issuance 
(age). The rationale for the variable 
age is that older firms have a lower 
information asymmetry than do 
younger firms. The earlier literatures 
on this issue also suggest that there is 
a negative relation between IPO first 
day initial returns and the age of the 
firm (i.e. Loughran and Ritter: 2004; 
Megginson and Weiss: 1991; and 
Carter and Manaster:1990). Accor-
dingly, the hypothesis for this 
variable is that the age of the firm will 
have a negative association with the 
extent of underpricing.  
 I also include the underwriter 
reputation (uwriter_rep) in the 
models. A previous empirical 
research finds that IPOs endorsed by 
well known underwriters will have 
less underpricing compare to the ones 
which are supported by less reputable 
underwriters (Carter and Manaster: 
1990). Therefore the hypothesis of 
this independent variable is that 
underwriter reputation will have a 
negative relation with the level of 
underpricing. 
 Another controlling variable in the 
models is the presence of the venture 
capitalists (venture_cap). A previous 
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study on this issue documents that the 
presence of venture capitalists will 
lower the costs of due diligence for 
the potential investors (Megginson 
and Weiss: 1991). Stated differently, 
the existence of venture capitalists 
prior to the IPO within the firm’s 
ownership is expected to reduce the 
uncertainty for the investors about the 
value of the firms. Accordingly the 
hypothesis for this variable is that the 
presence of the venture capitalists is 
expected to have a negative 
association with the degree of 
underpricing during IPO. 
 The last controlling variable for the 
models is the fraction of ownership 
retained by the insiders after IPO 
(ret_ownership). The high percentage 
of ownership retained by the 
incumbents after IPO indicates that 
the firm is still highly valuable hence 
the degree of underpricing is 
positively associated with 
incumbents’ fractional holding 
(Grinblatt and Hwang: 1989). 
Accordingly, the hypothesis for this 
controlling variable is a positive 
relation between the retained 
ownership and the degree of 
underpricing.  
Considering all of the controlling 
variables above and including them in the 
models, the comprehensive regression 
model is as the following 
 
adj_ret_1d = α + β1 
logR&D/net_assets + β2age + 
β3uwriter_rep + β4venture_cap +  
β5ret_ownership + ε.  .............(3) 
Alternatively, R&D intensity is 
measured by the ratio of R&D 
expenditures and expected market value, 
therefore the model is as shown below 
 
adj_ret_1d = α + β1 
logR&D/exp_mv + β2age + 
β3uwriter_rep + β4venture_cap +  
β5ret_ownership + ε.  .............(4) 
Model (3) and (4) incorporate the 
controlling variable age, underwriter 
reputation, the presence of venture 
capitalists and retained ownerships. 
Inspection of column one of Table V 
indicates that estimated coefficient of the 
R&D intensity of Model (3) is negative 
and statistically significant at one percent 
level of confidence. After controlling the 
variable age, underwriter reputation, the 
presence venture capitalists and retained 
ownerships, the coefficient on the level of 
R&D intensity implies that ten percent 
increase on the level of R&D intensity 
will decrease the extent of underpricing 
as much as 0.007 points. Model (3) of the 
same table also documents that the 
coefficient of the variable underwriter 
reputation is also statistically significant 
at 5 percent level of confidence while 
none of other controlling variables are 
individually significant. Further, 
inspection on column two of Table V also 
shows a relatively similar outcome. The 
estimated coefficient of R&D intensity 
measured by the ratio of R&D 
expenditures to expected market value is 
negative and strongly significant at one 
percent level of confidence. 
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Table V:                                                                                                                                                     
Multiple Regression Models of the First-Day IPO Adjusted Returns on the R&D 
Intensity, Age, Underwriters Reputation, the Presence of Venture Capitalists and 
Retained Ownership 
 Model (3) Model (4) 
 adj_ret_1d adj_ret_1d 
logR&D/net_assets -0.069**  
 (-2.78)  
logR&D/exp_mv  -0.080** 
  (-2.67) 
age -0.006 -0.001 
 (-1.35) (-0.16) 
uwriter_rep 0.027* 0.027* 
 (2.40) (2.07) 
venture_cap -0.042 -0.023 
 (-0.96) (-0.45) 
ret_ownership -0.130 -0.417 
 (-0.36) (-1.01) 
Constant -0.023 -0.051 
 (-0.08) (-0.16) 
Observations 82 82 
F-test 3.04* 3.62** 
R-squared 0.17 0.19 
Note: 
Absolute value of t-statistics in parentheses (with robust s.e.) 
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
 
Likewise the estimated coefficient 
of underwriter reputation is also 
negatively significant at five percent level 
of confidence. The sign of the coefficient 
of underwriter reputation for both models 
are counterintuitive with the hypothesis 
that the underwriter reputation is 
negatively associated with the extent of 
underpricing. Interpreting the estimated 
coefficient from the models, one can say 
that ceteris paribus, one point increase of 
the underwriter reputation rank will raise 
the extent of underpricing as much as 
0.027 point. Nevertheless, this result is 
actually consistent with a recent study 
regarding this issue. Loughran and Ritter 
suggest that reversal outcome associating 
the underpricing and prestigious 
underwriters during 1990s and internet 
bubble period is related to the analyst lust 
hypothesis (Loughran and Ritter: 2004). 
Even though most of the coefficients on 
the controlling variables are not 
significant for both models, performing 
the F-test for the all of variables on the 
regression indicates that they are jointly 
significant for both models as 
documented in Table V. 
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Table VI:                                                                                                                                                           
Simple and Multiple Regression Models of the Second-Day IPO Adjusted Returns 
on the R&D Intensity, Age, Underwriter Reputation, the Presence of Venture 
Capitalists and Retained Ownership 
 Model (5) Model (6) Model (7) Model (8) 
 adj_ret_2d adj_ret_2d adj_ret_2d adj_ret_2d 
logR&D/net_assets -0.085**  -0.080**  
 (-2.95)  (-2.72)  
logR&D/exp_mv  -0.073**  -0.072* 
  (-2.69)  (-2.17) 
age   -0.006 -0.001 
   (-1.24) (-0.15) 
uwriter_rep   0.019 0.020 
   (1.43) (1.35) 
venture_cap   -0.060 -0.045 
   (-1.14) (-0.75) 
ret_ownership   -0.062 -0.258 
   (-0.15) (-0.56) 
Constant -0.004 -0.158* -0.011 -0.072 
 (-0.14) (-1.90) (-0.04) (-0.22) 
Observations 82 82 82 82 
F-test 8.70** 7.25** 2.23 1.88 
R-squared 0.12 0.11 0.16 0.14 
Note: 
Absolute value of t-statistics in parentheses (with robust s.e.) 
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
 
To examine the robustness of the 
outcomes, I also developed the alternative 
models by substituting the dependent 
variable in the previous models with the 
extent of underpricing described as the 
difference between the offering price set 
by the firm and second-day market 
closing price. Inspection of Table VI for 
Model (5) and (6) indicates that compare 
to Table IV for Model (1) and (2) which 
employ the first-day initial returns as 
dependent variable, the estimated 
coefficients of R&D intensity do not 
differ significantly at the same level of 
confidence. The underpricing consistently 
has a strong and negative association with 
R&D intensity on both models. The 
relatively similar outcomes also applies 
for the Model (7) and (8) of the same 
table which are comparable to the Model 
(3) and (4) respectively of Table V, even 
though for the Model (8) the level of 
confidence shifts to 5 percent.  
The result of this study thus again 
corroborate the hypothesis that the extent 
underpricing is related to the level of 
R&D intensity for the firms in the 
pharmaceutical and biotechnology 
industries. The R&D in these industries is 
considered as the main contributor of 
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asymmetric information and uncertainty 
between the issuers and outsiders during 
IPO. The outcome of this study is 
consistent with the finding of previous 
literature. Guo et. al. documents that the 
influence of R&D intensity on the level 
of IPO underpricing in pharmaceutical 
and biotech industries is significantly 
lower than those of overall industries in 
the US (Guo et. al.:2006). Hence, the 
finding of this research paper here 
magnifies the distinct characteristic of the 
IPO underpricing phenomenon in the 
pharmaceutical and biotechnology sectors 
compare to the overall industries.  
 
Analysis  
For the industries, the product 
development is characterized by long 
term process through the completion of 
the serial laboratory tests, human trials 
and regulatory review process. In the US, 
the development process has to undergo 
more exhaustive process and has to 
follow a pre-clinic and several clinical 
trials phases before receiving the 
approval from the FDA. On this long 
term process, the firms have to allocate a 
large amount of R&D budget which is 
distributed into each stage of 
development. A previous study on the US 
pharmaceutical industry documents that 
R&D costs per drug in the latter stage of 
product development are higher than 
those in the earlier stages of product 
development. (DiMasi et. al.:2003).  
Moreover, the nature of R&D of the 
industries also relates the latter stage of 
development with more risks than those 
does on the earlier stages during the 
product development. At the advanced 
stages of product development, the firms 
have already dedicated the considerable 
amount of resources for R&D activities. 
In this case, if the product candidates 
failed to meet a certain intended target so 
that the likelihood of getting an approval 
from the FDA is small, then the firms 
must discontinue the product 
development.  
Further, I examine whether the low 
R&D intensity firms prior to IPO do have 
an association with the earlier stages of 
the development and visa versa. In order 
to do so, I compare annual R&D 
expenses for high and low R&D intensity 
firms for two years after the last financial 
reports prior to IPO. Assuming that only 
the limited of number of products under 
development are in the clinical stages of 
product development, the expectation is 
that if the R&D expenditures do increase 
considerably during that period then we 
can presume that those firms are in the 
earlier stage of development (i.e. Phase I 
or Phase II). On the other hand, if the 
R&D expenses only increase modestly, 
relative to the pre issue level then most 
probably the firms have already been in 
the mature stage of product development 
(i.e. Phase III). DiMasi et. al. documents 
that on average, the development costs 
per drug increase significantly when the 
development progress enters Phase III. 
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Table VII:                                                                                                                                                        
The Average Increase of R&D Expenditures between Low and High R&D 
Intensity  
Year Low R&D Intensity (%) High R&D Intensity (%) 
1 109.39 56.67 
2 32.03 26.23 
 
Using the same sample of 82 IPO 
firms as in the previous section, the firms 
are grouped based on whether they are 
above or below the median of R&D 
intensity measured by the ratio of R&D 
expenditures to the book value. Further, 
the increase of nominal R&D expendi-
tures within two years following IPO is 
calculated after adjusting it with the CPI 
index for the US and using year-2005 as a 
based year for each firm. By taking the 
average of the increase of R&D 
expenditures for both categories, we can 
then see the difference between these two 
groups.  
Inspection of Table VII shows that 
for the low R&D intensity firms, the 
average increase of R&D expenditures 
relative to the R&D expenditures prior to 
IPO is 109 percent. It implies that their 
budgets for product development raise 
more than two folds at the year of IPO 
and it is followed by 32 percent increase 
on the subsequent year. In contrast, for 
the firms with high R&D intensity, the 
R&D budgets only increase 57 and 26 
percent during the year of IPO and a year 
afterward respectively. The difference on 
the average increase of R&D expendi-
tures between low and high R&D 
intensity firms confirms the expectation, 
that the firms with low R&D intensity are 
most likely still in the earlier stages of 
product development while the high 
R&D intensity firms have been in the 
advanced stage of product development. 
For the low R&D intensity firms, the 
substantial increase in R&D expenditures 
is expected as the firms move to the latter 
phase of product development which 
requires a considerable amount of 
resources. 
Therefore the rationale of a 
negative relation between R&D intensity 
and the extent underpricing is then 
relatively straightforward. High R&D 
intensity is associated with the latter stage 
of product development. In these stages, 
more information regarding the R&D 
activities is available to the public. 
Information regarding the progress of the 
development, including the number of 
patents created during the process of 
development for example is becoming 
more available to the investors. 
Information also becomes more specific 
to the several most prospective product 
candidates. In this regard, investors will 
have better information regarding the 
R&D activities of the firm. As a result, 
less asymmetric information between the 
corporate insiders and the investors is 
expected for the firm which has already 
reached latter stage of the development. 
The less asymmetric information between 
the insiders and investors has a 
consequence on less underpricing. 
Moreover, when the firm has already 
reached the advanced stage of 
development, it exposes to high potential 
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risks of failures of the development. As a 
result, the investors will perceive the 
value of the firm modestly, close to the 
offering price set by the issuers. Hence, 
the firms with high R&D intensity tend to 
be less underpriced relative to those with 
low R&D intensity during IPO.  
On the other hand, for the firm with 
low R&D intensity, the product 
development is presumably still in the 
earlier stages of development. In these 
stages, the information regarding the 
progress of development is actually very 
limited. Hence, less specific information 
regarding R&D activities is actually 
ready to be revealed to the public. Given 
the level of asymmetric information here, 
investors or financial analysts may give 
excessive value on the future of the firm, 
because of the over optimism about the 
prospect of product development. On the 
contrary, the firm’s managers or 
underwriters indeed will act more 
carefully in valuing the firm on these 
stages, since there are many uncertainties 
regarding the prospect of product 
development.  They also have to take into 
account the possibility to face future 
lawsuit from the investors if their 
valuation proven to be inaccurate. 
Therefore, considering the risks factors 
above, the issuer may set the offering 
price of the new issuance modestly. 
Given the high degree of asymmetric 
information, the firms with low R&D 
intensity will have higher underpricing 
compare to the firms with high R&D 
intensity during IPO. 
Given the argument above, 
accordingly, the extent underpricing will 
have a non linear relationship with the 
level of R&D intensity. The level of 
R&D intensity indicates the extent of 
asymmetric information between the 
issuers and investors. Information 
regarding the progress of product 
development becomes more available and 
accessible to public when the firms are on 
the advanced stage of the development 
than those does in the earlier stages of 
development. In other words, the 
information regarding R&D activities is 
becoming less asymmetric between 
issuers and investors as the progress of 
development move to the more mature 
stages. In this sense, any relevant 
information revealed to the public during 
earlier stages will be worth more to the 
investors relative those revealed on the 
latter stage of development. For example, 
investors will react stronger to the 
information regarding the success of the 
firms in registering the patent during the 
earlier stages than does in the latter stage, 
assuming that several patents may have 
been generated in the latter stage of 
development. As a result, the effort to 
reduce the problem of asymmetric 
information (by revealing more relevant 
information) will have a higher impact to 
the extent of underpricing when the firms 
are on the earlier stages of development 
and conversely it has a lower impact 
when the firms are on the advanced 
stages of development.  
Summarizing, this study argues that 
the information asymmetry between the 
firms’ insiders and potential investors 
causes the underpricing phenomenon 
during IPO for the firms within 
pharmaceutical and biotechnology 
industries. The finding of this study 
suggests that R&D is the main 
contributor to the asymmetric 
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information. Assuming that the offering 
price set by the insiders has reflected the 
underlying value of the firm, a negative 
association between underpricing and the 
level of R&D intensity implies that 
investors, who manage their portfolio on 
the lower R&D intensity firms, perceive 
more optimistic regarding the prospect of 
the firm in the future. In contrast, given 
more information they have, the higher 
R&D intensity investors will actually 
behave more carefully resulting on less 
initial underpricing. By identifying R&D 
activities as the main source of 
asymmetric information which in turn, 
has an impact on the initial underpricing 
during IPO, this study offers a 
contribution to solve the underpricing 
puzzle especially for the firms in the 
pharmaceutical and biotechnology 
industries.  
Considering that underpricing is 
actually costly for firms during IPO, the 
issuers can actually reduce the problem of 
asymmetric information by acting more 
progressively to reveal more relevant 
information regarding their R&D 
activities to the public. In this regard, the 
IPO firms may reduce the “money left on 
the table” problem by letting the market 
to judge the fair price of the new stocks 
during the book building and then 
consider this market truthful revelation of 
the stock price before finalizing the 
offering price on the IPO date. With this 
effort, the firms can be prevented from 
the excessive underpricing during IPO so 
that they can optimize the raise of capital 
from going public. On the other hand, 
given the importance of R&D activities 
for the current and future productivity 
and growth of the firms, it is rational to 
expect the investors and financial analyst 
to acquire the information more 
aggressively. Given the complexity of the 
R&D for the firms within this sectors, 
they may educate them self through the 
various ways in order to better evaluate 
the firms.  
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
This research paper remarkably has 
identified R&D as the main source of 
information asymmetry, which leads to 
cause underpricing phenomenon for the 
pharmaceutical and biotech firms during 
IPO. IPO underpricing is considered 
costly for the issuers, therefore the efforts 
to fully disclosed the information related 
to the nature of R&D activities including 
the progresses, potential risks, 
probabilities of success as well as the 
future prospects of the products under 
development, that may influence the 
current and future values of companies 
can be expected to reduce adverse 
impacts of the asymmetric information 
during IPO. Furthermore, the firms may 
reduce the level of underpricing by taking 
into account the positive sentiment of the 
markets following IPO when determining 
the offering price of their new issuance. 
Likewise, for the investors who intend to 
manage their portfolios in these sectors 
are expected to deeply investigate the 
progress of product development which 
tends to be missing or less clear-cut in the 
prospectuses.  
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